This paper examines how herd behavior (mimetism) and network effects determine bilateral migration flows to thirteen EU-15 countries. Using an adapted gravity model controlling for economic activity, welfare progressivity, as well as geospatial and historic relationships, the results force us to question our explanations for migration flows. Herd behavior positively influences European migration flows, whereas network complementarities in the receiving country do not consistently predict, and may in some cases reduce, the likelihood of immigrant inflows. Moreover, economic activity, particularly labor market conditions, plays a lesser role in the migrants' choice of destination than was previously thought. The introduction of herd behavior as a determinant of European Migration in our empirical analysis hopefully will change the paradigm for understanding migration.
Introduction
The quest for better living standards is the common explanation for migration. The reality is more complex. People might also migrate for cultural reasons. Migration flow studies must control for migrants' economic background and for their reasons for leaving their country. A person with a poor economic background is more likely to migrate hoping for a better life, whereas social andcommunication flow between the previous migrant and the migration candidate, leading to a well-thought migration decision. If this were true, host countries would not have newly-arrived migrants and old migrants in the poverty trap. Therefore, a lot of these so-called network effects should be in fact re-qualified as herd behavior. Herd behavior sometimes leads to positive outcomes, but is also very likely to lead to inefficient decisions. In numerous situations, had the migration candidate known the exact socio-economic conditions of the former migrants with the same background as her own, she would have gone to a different host country.
The paper resolves to clarify the nature of the migration flow drivers into thirteen Western European countries belonging to the EU-15 group. Much of the current discourse on European immigration remains biased towards traditional explanations. While previous studies have contributed to the existing literature by highlighting the welfare's importance in immigration decisions, they continue to lack adequate controls for social perception phenomena. Warin and Svaton (2008) conclude that generous total social protection expenditure in the host country is positively correlated with immigrant inflows towards EU-15 countries. However, migration flows are likely to be a more complex mechanism than previously thought.
We estimate network effects using the stock of individuals born in the origin country residing in the host country and we estimate herd effects by employing past migration inflows. Herd behavior implies that informational cascades have an influence on the complex mechanism of immigration. Imperfect information in the immigration decision process may lead prospective emigrants to emulate previous emigrants because they assume that their forebears possess better information. We hope to identify the role of these social phenomena relative to other push and pull agents of migration towards EU-15 countries. To introduce these informational cascades, we will present a game theoretical model illustrating a sub-Pareto equilibrium, which happens when a player decides to act based on the lack of communication between the two players.
We will also illustrate and expand upon this theoretical model with an empirical estimation. Our empirical analysis using aggregate data relies on an expanded gravity model typically geared towards bilateral trade or migration flows. Accounting for a variety of biases implicit in the available statistical estimators, the likelihood of cross-panel heteroscedasticity and serial correlation within panels arising with longitudinal datasets, we estimate our models using the pooled ordinary least squares, generalized least squares, and the Parks-Kmenta feasible generalized least squares methods. We find that social perceptions are important predictors of immigrant inflows, however, the results also challenge commonly held notions about network effects. Much of the previous literature may have captured the effects of informational cascades (herd behavior) as part of the network effect. We note that herd behavior positively influences a migrant's destination in the EU-15, while the network effect generally correlates negatively and seldom influences migration decisions. This startling result indicates that more attention needs to be directed towards social perception as a migration flow determinant and that preconceived notions of network effects need to be reevaluated.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Part two is a literature review focusing on international migration theory while paying particular attention to the role of networks and informational cascades. Part three presents a theoretical model illustrating informational cascades in the context of migration decisions. Part four provides an overview of the data sources and stylized facts. Part five describes the empirical analysis and presents the results. Part six discusses the policy implications of the analysis.
Literature Review
In this section, we present a range of theories that have shaped the study of international migration economics. Moreover, we evaluate several recent theoretical and methodological developments concerning immigrant's destination choices. We use the results to design an empirical model capable of explaining the role of network effects and herd behavior in determining European migration inflows.
Theoretical Origins
The entirety of human history is a migration story. Therefore, migration has persisted in the minds of social scientists. People move for a multitude of reasons that are important to understand as migration has broad implications for all parties involved. Ernest G. Ravenstein (1889) was the first to attempt to construct an explanatory framework for analyzing migration. Drawing on census data, Ravenstein explains migration currents using a "push-pull" paradigm. Adverse conditions in one location such as "oppressive laws, heavy taxation, an unattractive climate, [and] uncongenial social surroundings" exert a "push" on individuals to relocate. Conversely, positive conditions in one location (underdeveloped resources, a deficiency of labor-supply, etc.) "pull" individuals from their current location. Furthermore, Ravenstein notes that migration is negatively correlated with the distance between origin and destination location. Consequently, migration is a gradual process in which migrants move in stages rather than in one long journey. Rounding out his theory of migration, Ravenstein indicates that migration differentials such as gender significantly impact an individual's mobility.
Many of Ravenstein's conclusions are still relevant to current theory. Income, unemployment, and welfare differentials persist as "push-pull" mechanisms. More modern characteristics of the International System have, however, widened the scope of Ravenstein's paradigm. Many western governments, for instance, have adopted restrictive immigration policies, which "push" back on migration inflows. While groundbreaking for its time, Ravenstein's study does not paint a complete picture of migration determinants.
Neoclassical Migration Theory
The neoclassical migration theory provides both macroeconomic and microeconomic explanations. The macroeconomic argument says international migration results from spatial imbalances in factor endowments and in labor supply and demand. Countries with relatively high labor to capital ratios have low wages, whereas countries with relatively low labor to capital ratios have high wages. The wage imbalance between locations induces a flow of labor from the relatively low-wage origin country to the high-wage host country.
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The transfer of labor, therefore, exhibits an equilibrating force on the respective labor to capital ratios and wages. Assuming that migration was costless, international wages would converge. However, reality demonstrates no justification for such an assumption.
Individual choices explain migration from the microeconomic perspective. Sjaastad (1962) followed by Todaro (1969) frame migration as a cost-benefit problem. Migrants weigh costs (transportation, learning a foreign language, adjusting to a new labor market, etc.) against the potential benefits (improved wages associated with greater labor productivity). The individual will migrate if the expected income returns in the host country are greater than the sum of migration costs and income in the origin country.
Increasingly, however, empirical analyses demonstrate that neoclassical elements do not sufficiently predict locational choices made by immigrants. Examining migration to the United States over a five-year period (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , Zavodny (1998) discovered that economic conditions (unemployment rate and the average manufacturing wage) are statistically weak indicators of immigrants' settlement patterns. Furthermore, in an investigation of East-West migration in Germany and migration within the EU, Alecke et al. (2001) reveal the tendency of neoclassical factors to overestimate migration patterns. These results indicate that strictly economic variables cannot account for all migration determinants.
Welfare and Migration
Another explanation has become popular in recent years. The rise of the welfare state, particularly in a European context, has generated a body of research that questions the linkages between welfare and immigration. Early studies such as Borjas and Trejo (1991) and Borjas (1994) indicate that welfare participation rates among immigrants have risen above welfare participation rates among natives in the United States. Moreover, whether or not immigrants "pay their way" for this more intensive welfare participation is ambiguous. The result will depend mostly upon the selected accounting methods.
Another major question within the welfare-migration debate is whether welfare provisions exhibit a magnet effect on immigrant inflows. Previous studies have provided varied results. Borjas (1999) discovers, for example, that immigration in the United States displays evidence of welfare-magnetism. Immigrants typically clustered geographically in states with the highest welfare provisions. By contrast, in an investigation of migration flows to OECD countries, Pedersen et al. (2008) find that welfare-magnetism plays no significant role in predicting migration patterns. Most recently, however, in a study of the same European context to be used in this paper, Warin and Svaton (2008) show that social protection expenditures among EU-15 countries are positively significant determinants of immigrant inflows but are not the primary reason of migration. This final result indicates that welfare should be included in an analysis such as ours, which considers European immigration. However, the mixed results overall necessitate further investigation.
Network Theory of International Migration
The neoclassical model's tendency to underemphasize social explanations for migration patterns has led economists to turn to other social sciences for answers. Studies of the Great Migration of southern African Americans to the northern United States provide key findings vis-à-vis economic migration theory. Gottlieb (1987) and Grossman (1989) suggest that large enclaves of African Americans in Pittsburgh and Chicago directly influenced to southern African Americans' migration decisions. Much of the international migration literature now champions migrant networks.
Migrant networks function in two distinct ways that directly affect the cost-benefit analyses mentioned in section 2.2. First, networks provide a costreducing complementarity. Existing social linkages reduce the likelihood that subsequent immigrants will incur certain adjustment costs. For example, new immigrants often need to adopt the host country's language; however, in cases where migrant networks are sufficiently large and well-integrated (ex. the Hispanic community in California) language learning may not be necessary. Second, networks also reduce the risks associated with migration.
Migrant networks reduce risk in two ways: direct linkages and information. Through established social connections, migrant networks can provide employment leads for arriving immigrants. Furthermore, migrant networks provide accurate information on labor market conditions. In sum, migrant networks' positive externalities will have swaying power over migration decisions and destination choices. Munshi (2003) , for example, confirms that exogenously larger networks among Mexican immigrants in the U.S. result in better likelihood of employment and better employment. Furthermore, the networks provided the most assistance to disadvantaged participants (women, the low-skilled, etc.). Other empirical analyses confirm the network effect hypothesis (see Zavodny, 1998; Bauer et al., 2000; Bruder, 2003; Pedersen et al. 2008, and Rainer & Siedler, 2008) .
The network theory, however, is not without its inconsistencies. Indeed, as Bauer et al. (2000) note, networks do not always positively correlate with migration. Initially, network externalities positively affect utility as the migrant population in a location rises. However, once the migrant population reaches a critical threshold the oversupply of labor overshadows positive network externalities. Graphically, this result demonstrates an inverse U-shaped relationship between the number of migrants in a location and the probability of migration to that location.
Herd Behavior and Migration
Choice theory is the latest addition to migration theory literature. If perfect information were available, migrants' best choice would distinguish itself from all alternatives. However, as is the case in reality, imperfect information is likely to be the norm, therefore, decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty. What decision rule do individuals follow under such circumstances? Keynes (1936) explains a similar uncertainty in the context of asset markets and demonstrates that investors disregard personal information in favor of mimicking the actions of predecessors. Epstein (2002) is the first to adopt Keynes' notion of informational cascades in a migration context. Epstein arrives at a startling proposition. If the number of immigrants in a given country is greater than immigrants in all the other alternative countries by at least two individuals, then all future individuals will immigrate to that country regardless of their personal information. This could have significant explanatory value with regards to the puzzling results from neoclassical studies that said economic variables were not sufficient for predicting migration.
Modeling Network Effects and Herd Behavior
Given the popularity of the network effect argument, modeling networks has become somewhat standardized. The majority of empirical models considered represent network effects using data on immigrants residing in a given location. In a simple gravity regression, Zavodny (1998) accounts for the immigrant population using data on the percentage of the state's foreign-born population. The regressions also include proxies for neoclassical elements (average unemployment rate, real average hourly wage in manufacturing, and marginal income tax rate differentials), for welfare generosity, and total population. Like Zavodny, Bruder (2003) uses the migrant stock as a proxy for networks. The model presents some variations. First, all variables are lagged by one period because migration decisions are based on experiences rather than on short-term economic developments. Furthermore, the regression is log-linear in design, which acknowledges that migrant behavior is based on choices between several alternatives. Bauer et al. (2000) provide a similar alternative. In the estimations, conditional logit models are used. This type of model is particularly appropriate when trying to capture choice behavior. The explanatory variables include attributes of the choice alternatives (ex. cost) as well as characteristics of the individuals making the choices (ex. income).
None of the above analyses and models attempts to capture herd behavior. Using Epstein's (2002) discussion of informational cascades, Bauer et al. (2002) incorporate a herd behavior variable into a conditional logit model. The flow of migrants during the year before an individual migrates serves as a proxy for the variable. Furthermore, the variable differentiates the flow to a particular destination relative to other locations, which reflects the understanding that herd behavior implies that migrants should conduct locational choice based only on the largest flow. Therefore, the herd behavior variable is best represented in relative terms rather than absolutely because it makes relative changes to flows visible. Herd behavior is modeled, therefore, as the difference between the migrant stock of country x residing in country y at time t (or, STOCK xyt ) and the migrant stock of country x residing in country y at time t-1 (or, STOCK xy(t-1) ). Hence, the herd behavior variable is as follows: HERD xyt = STOCK xyt -STOCK xy(t-1) . The model also accounts for the nonlinear relationship between the size of the migrant stock in a location and the probability of migration to that location mentioned in section 2.3 by including both a linear and a squared term of the network effects variable.
Despite the progress made by Zavodny (1998), Bauer et al. (2002 ), Espstein (2002 ), Bruder (2003 , the analysis would require more control variables. While some effort is made to control for the transportation and monetary costs involved in migration, other cost controls (lack of a common language) are neglected. Welfare differentials between origin and host countries are not present in the model. The present study on European migration proposes to integrate and economic variables representing macro and micro conditions, costs, and welfare. This will allow us hopefully to isolate the network and herd effects from any background noise.
Model set-up

Players
We represent a two-player game, 1, 2 i  . One player is the first migrant who is now in the host country (called "current immigrant") and the other is the migration candidate. The current immigrant knows the state of nature: her own economic situation in the host country. At the beginning of each game, the migration candidate makes her decision based on what she knows about the state of nature:
. A corresponds to a situation in which the economic integration in the host country is easy for the candidate's profile, and the migration candidate should not invest some more time to find a better host country. B corresponds to a situation in which the economic integration of the migration candidate will not be easy. The objective functions can be represented by:
where i C represents the total cost of migration candidate i in the state of nature A or B .
Strategies
The migration candidate has two options: low search costs (m) or high search costs ( M ). Low search costs mean that the migration candidate may not spend too much time or resources searching for a better fit in terms of host country. On the other hand, high search costs mean that the migration candidate plans to devote most or all her time and effort to find the best host country based on her own profile. The total cost function is:
The optimal-Pareto solution is thus:
In such a configuration, payments are
and they prevent the prisoner's dilemma, as represented in Figure 1 . In reality, the coordination mechanism of the commitment strategies of the two players is imperfect. Building on Rubinstein's (1989) approach and adapted from Demange and Ponssard (1994) , we model the interaction between the current immigrant and the migration candidate. This interaction takes place within a context of incomplete information concerning the state of nature. In order to represent the "noise" in the coordination mechanism, we assume that the current immigrant has private information on the state of nature. The current immigrant, then, freely passes this information to the other player, the migration candidate. If the economic integration of migrants is easy in the host country, the current immigrant simply does not send additional messages. On the other hand, if the state of nature is such that economic integration is not easy, she also sends messages to warn the migration candidate. This transmission corresponds to the modeling of co-ordination. To begin the analysis, we assume that the most probable event is state of nature A, i.e., that economic integration is easy. If B occurs, a message is sent from the current immigrant to the migration candidate. The latter receives the message, understands the warning about bad economic integration and therefore sends a message back to the current immigrant acknowledging the receipt. The current immigrant then responds with another confirmation. This entire exchange is made necessary by potential communication failures: the information contained in the message sent by one of the players has a small probability of being lost or misunderstood by the other player, 0 q  . The probability that a message still circulates beyond a very large number of exchanges is thus a priori weak, but still exists and is not insignificant.
The game has an infinite horizon because of the back-and-forth transmission of messages. The procedure of sending messages does not form part of the strategy: the real game begins only when no further messages are exchanged between the two players.
Formally, we use the following notations to depict this situation:  0 C , the beginning of the game ; the current immigrant discovers that the state of nature is either A or B with the probability distribution The fact that q>0 is not a trivial assumption. The interesting feature of this assumption and of the model that follows is that even when the uncertainty seems to be resolved, the outcome may still be Pareto ineffective. Indeed, as soon as the migration candidate receives a message regarding the state of nature, she knows by definition that the state of nature is B . Thus, except A I and 0 I , the uncertainty is no longer due to the initial event, which is now known to both players, but rather to the state of information of the other player. For example, in 2 I , the migration candidate replied to the first message with 2 C , and, as she did not receive any further messages, she does not know if the current immigrant is in 1 I (the current immigrant sent the first message 1 C but did not receive C 2 ) or in 3
I
(the current immigrant received 2 C but did not send anything after that 
Knowing t I , a player knows that the other player is more likely to be in 1
The implication of Lemma 1 is that, when a player does not receive a message in which the other player confirms the reception, the former thinks that the latter is in fact more likely to invest in a low search cost strategy rather than a high one. If the migration candidate did not receive a message, she thinks that it is more likely that the current immigrant plays as if the state of nature was A. 
LEMMA 2.
In other words, if the migration candidate did not receive any messages, she thinks that it is more likely that the state of nature is A, rather than that the first message was lost. □
To obtain perfect coordination, the current immigrant must thus play m if A. As a consequence, the migration candidate will make a weak commitment. The following proposition makes that clear.
PROPOSITION 1:
When the state of nature is A, the property of conditional optimality implies that the migration candidate plays m. Proof. Let us determine a sequential equilibrium in which the current immigrant plays m if A. In this case, in 0 I , the migration candidate minimizes its loss expectation, knowing that it will obtain: Here it is a Pareto-optimal equilibrium since the host country is a wellsuited country in terms of economic integration of our migration candidate, and that she decided not to look for another host country. This is the illustration of a real network effect, i.e. when the networking helps the decision to migrate to the right country. 
E m P I I O B P I I O B E m P I I O B P I I O B
As     This equilibrium is sub-optimal. The migration candidate should invest some new resources to find a better-suited host country, but won't. This is how we set up the herd behavior. In retrospect, the migration candidate will always consider that the state of nature is favorable to her own emigration even though the state of nature can be B and would require some more time searching for a better suited host country. This game's setup is interesting because it illustrates both network effects (benefitting from communication with a current immigrant in the host country and emigrating to a well-suited host country) and herd behavior (not being sure about the level of economic integration of migrants, but deciding to migrate anyway).
Data and Stylized Facts
Data Sources
Our empirical application employs Warin and Svaton's (2008) cross-sectional time-series pair-based dataset.
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The original dataset was constructed for the immigration relationships between fourteen host countries in the European Union 3 and seventy-six origin countries during the 1995-2004 period. Migration data such as immigrant inflow by nationality as a percentage of the host country population and stock of foreign population by nationality in the host country comes from the OECD International Migration Outlook (2008). Due to data asymmetries, one host country, Ireland, was dropped from the dataset. Furthermore, the time-series has been expanded to include data for 1994, 2005, and 2006. The dataset is uniquely constructed. It exhibits an inherent bias by using an anchor of the thirteen host countries, each of which are paired with the top fifteen countries in terms of emigration to that host country. Assuming perfect data this would correspond to 195 pairs for thirteen years and produce 2,535 observations per variable. However, migration data on the top fifteen origin countries for several small host countries could not be accessed, thus, making our panel unbalanced. The final dataset, therefore, includes 183 pairs for the period 1994-2006, spanning seventy-six different origin countries.
The remaining variables describing welfare progressivity, economic activity, and gravity characteristics were obtained from a variety of sources. Eurostat (European Commission, 2008) provided the social protection 2 Upon updating and expanding the dataset, estimations were performed to mimic those conducted by Warin and Svaton (2008) in order to ensure consistency. The results gathered confirmed Warin and Svaton's conclusions. 3 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom expenditure, the old-age dependency ratio, and the cost of labor in the host country. Variables such as unemployment rates, GDP per capita in both host and origin countries were collected from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2008) . Last, gravity characteristics controlling for geospatial and cultural effects including distance and historical relationship were found in the Cepii 4 Distance Database (Cepii, 2008) . Although our dataset represents an improvement over most of what has been employed in earlier studies, there exist certain problems worth noting. Namely, the dataset exhibits some unbalance. For example, in data on certain variables in unstable source countries such as Somalia and Afghanistan, the number of observations may be less than the norm for other source countries. Furthermore, we have data on immigrant inflows to and immigrant stock in the majority of destination countries for most of the years; once again, however, there are certain instances in which the number of observations varies from the norm. Therefore, we have provided summary statistics for all variables in the following section. For complete descriptions of all included variables, please see Appendix Table A.
Stylized Facts
Performing a rudimentary estimation of variance according to time-specific and host country-specific fixed effects demonstrates the degree to which spatial or temporal effects are relevant. Table 1 presents the results from one of these estimations that focused on the effects specific to host countries, which describe twenty-seven percent to forty-six percent of the dependent variable's variance.
By contrast, the time-specific effects highlighted in Table 2 do not predict nearly as much of the dependent variable's variation. Across all five divisions of the dataset time-specific effects predict a maximum of four percent of the overall variance.
We may conclude, therefore, that host country-specific effects play a significant role in determining migration flows while time-specific effects are less important. The summary statistics for all non-dummy variables are provided in Table 3 and are organized into sub-samples by country of origin. 
Methodology and Analysis
Estimation Procedure
Given the nature of the dataset (pair-based cross-sectional time series) we acknowledge the probability of panel heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, which may undermine the assumptions from the ordinary least squares estimator. The Hausman test reveals that the data are not well suited for poolability. The test indicates, furthermore, that fixed effects should be used. This confirms our initial belief that country-specific effects play an important role in the model. In addition, we conducted tests for normality on all explanatory variables and concluded that the data were generally non-normal. In response, we employ loglog specifications in order to create distributions closer to Gaussian functions. Like Bruder (2003) we assume that the decision to migrate is more likely to be influenced by historical experiences than by short-term economic activity. We, therefore, apply one-period lags to all explanatory variables describing conditions in host and origin countries. In contrast to Bauer et al's (2002) use of a conditional logit framework we select and implement a gravity framework. Data limitations motivated this decision and restricted our analysis to European macrolevel data. The gravity framework does not provide an optimal analysis of alternative choices; however, it will provide an adequate estimation of social perception variables as determinants of immigrant inflows to a particular country relative to other explanatory variables.
Taking into account the limitations of available estimators, we perform regressions on our empirical model using three different estimators. Despite the Hausman test's indications against pooling our data, we include results for a least squares dummy variable estimator under the assumption that the estimator has a tendency to underestimate the significance of explanatory variables. Explanatory variables demonstrating significance despite this bias should aid our interpretation of the results generated by different estimators. Given the panel nature of the dataset we turn next to a generalized least squares estimator incorporating time and country-specific fixed effects. This estimator, however, may complicate analysis as it does not completely ensure the equal variance assumption for the dependent variable across the data nor does it correct for autocorrelation. We, therefore, also use a feasible generalized least squares estimator in our model using the method outlined by Parks (1967) and Kmenta (1997) , which rectifies any serial correlation or heteroscedasticity.
Empirical Analysis
Due to the fact that the seventy-six origin countries in the dataset do not represent a homogenous selection of countries, but rather a diverse sampling of socioeconomic situations, we divide the dataset into four categories to analyze alongside the overall sample. We estimate immigrant inflows from EU-24 member countries, Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, other Eastern European countries, and countries belonging to the so-called "developing world."
Social Perception
Our original model is expressed in terms of equation (6) where INFLOW ij,t represents the annual inflow of immigrants from the origin to the host country as a percentage of the host country's total population, HERD ij,t-1 is past immigrant inflow and functions as a proxy for herd behavior, STOCK ij,t-1 is the percentage of host country population representing those individuals residing in the host country of the origin country nationality 5 , SOC_TOT ij,t-1 captures the cumulative social protection expenditure per capita in the host country, UE_H ij,t-1 indicates the unemployment rate in the host country, similarly UE_O ij,t-1 denotes the unemployment rate in the origin country, LABOR ij,t-1 measures the real unit cost of labor in the host country, AGE ij,t-1 expresses the old age dependency ratio in the host country, and DIST ij is a measure of geographical distance separating the countries within a pair. HISTORY ij is a gravity dummy that indicates whether or not paired countries were formerly in a colonial or colonial-like relationship. 6 Last,  represents a vector of time dummies included in the estimations when applicable.
Considering the precedent established by Warin and Svaton (2008) using a reduced form of the dataset, we expect several results to remain consistent. The level of total social protection expenditure should be positively correlated with the influx of immigrants. Positive labor market conditions in the host country will also attract immigrants. We expect, in other words, that high unemployment rates in the host country will exhibit negative correlation with the immigrant inflows. By similar reasoning, we may assume that high unemployment rates in the sending country will compliment increased immigrant inflows. We may also anticipate that ageing societies will, in an effort to equilibrate the size of the labor force with the size of the population, be characterized by greater immigration inflows. With regards to our hypotheses, we expect that a positive correlation of the stock variable with the dependent variable would capture positive network complementarity perceptions. Furthermore, we anticipate that the herd variable will be positively correlated with the dependent variable, thus, demonstrating that immigrants perceive their antecedents as having accurate information. 5 The following caveat should be noted when interpreting the STOCK variable as a proxy for network effects. The stock of immigrants residing in the destination country in a given year represents the net flow of immigrants over time (i.e. the total number of persons remaining in the destination country from previous inflows, outflows, and return migration in previous years). Therefore, the STOCK variable may, as Pederson et al. (2008) state, be "weakly exogenous." 6 Variables for contiguity and common official language were initially part of the equation, but were ultimately removed prior to estimation due to instances of multicollinearity. We expect that this will not significantly alter the results since we assume that contiguity will be to some measure captured by the distance variable and common language will be captured by the variable accounting for historic relationships. Estimations of our model explaining immigrant flows provide startling results vis-à-vis the prior literature and the above assumptions (Tables 4, 5, and 6) . As demonstrated by ninety-nine percent significance levels and positive correlation between immigrant inflows and the proxy for herd effects across all three estimators and all four sub-samples of the dataset, herd behavior is a principal driver of migration flows. Conversely, the immigrant stock variable provides mixed results. Curiously, if the variable sends any signal to immigrants it generally does so negatively.
The results for the EU-24 sub-sample are particularly interesting because they indicate that the network effect negatively impacts immigrant inflows. This negative correlation might confirm the inverse U-shaped relationship between the stock of immigrants and immigrant inflows posited by Bauer et al. (2000) . In other words, a critical threshold has been reached at which the negative wage effect generated by the immigrant stock from EU-24 countries begins to outweigh the positive network externalities, thus providing fewer incentives to migrate. The host country's unemployment rate consistently has a positive 7 influence across estimators and the various data samples. Rather than accepting the confusing indication that high unemployment rates in the host country are attracting immigrants, we may reason that individuals are migrating to EU-15 countries in spite of high unemployment rates. Immigrants either do not care about host country unemployment or they do not have access to unemployment figures that ceteris paribus might influence their choice of location.
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Unemployment in the origin country performs in a manner generally consistent with previous analyses. When significant, higher rates of unemployment in the sending country typically push individuals out, creating immigrant inflows; however, they play a less significant role as a determinant than do host country unemployment rates. Generally, the real unit cost of labor in the host country does not influence migrants' choice of location. Immigrants from Eastern European countries, nevertheless, seem to be driven towards receiving countries with higher labor costs. This may be explained in terms of the relationship between labor costs and welfare provisions. Higher unit labor costs often result from the firms' need to 7 The sign of the coefficients for this variable is unexpected; therefore we also estimated the dependent variable with host country unemployment as the sole explanatory variable to test this result. Alone, unemployment in the host country behaves consistently with the prior literature (i.e. influences negatively the dependent variable). Moreover, we conducted a similar test for all other explanatory variables, each of which demonstrated effects consistent with past literature. 8 Among EU-24 origin countries we may expect some indifference regarding unemployment in the host country given that European unemployment is generally homogenous across the region. As regards ignorance to unemployment we may consider any number of examples from the developing world or some Eastern European countries in which information about the rest of the world is scarce and local conditions are poor enough to motivate emigration regardless. pay for healthcare benefits, other insurance, and pensions. We should note, then, that relative to the other sub-samples, the Eastern European countries respond positively more consistently to social protection expenditure. On the whole, the old-age dependency ratio in the receiving country is not consistent across estimators or sub-samples; however, there is some indication that the former CEE countries now belonging to the EU and the Eastern European countries are not attracted to countries with ageing societies.
There is no observable trend among the geospatial and historical relationships, yet migration originating in EU-24 countries appears to be negatively influenced by migration costs and by prior historic relationships. The European Union's Single Market may explain the latter result because several European states possessing formal colonial or colonial-like ties are now highly integrated. The free flow of goods and services throughout the Single Market may substitute for the flow of individuals. 
Policy Implications and Conclusion
At the outset of this paper we criticized the rationale behind prior empirical studies of migration insofar as they have not included sufficient mechanisms that capture the effects of social perception. Our results strongly support the above notion, applying Bauer et al.'s (2002) conception of herd behavior to the unique EU-15 anchored dataset characterizing the European bilateral migration context developed by Warin and Svaton (2008) in the gravity framework.
The paramount finding that herd behavior is not only present, but is also a major determinant of immigration in the European context indicates that more attention must be directed towards understanding social perception phenomena where immigration is concerned. Moreover, we suggest reevaluating acceptance among empirical economists of the network effect as a determinant of migration flows. Having noted that the network externality is likely to exhibit an inverse Ushaped relationship with immigrant inflows, we must consider that network effects can also occur in the negative direction, like in the case of immigration between the EU-24 countries. In addition, the diminished significance of network effects when evaluated alongside herd effects leads us to reason that much of the literature discussing the network effect may have in fact been capturing some herd behavior. Herds can give rise to networks and networks can likewise generate herds.
Based on the above, policy makers concerned with immigration should reconsider the weight they attribute to economic and welfare explanations. Many immigrants may choose their destinations irrespective of labor market conditions and state-provided safety nets. Coordinated economic and welfare policy-making that specifically targets reduced immigration may be ineffective or even damaging. Reduction of social protection expenditures for new migrants, for example, as a deterrent against immigration is likely to cause more harm than to reduce immigrant inflows. If this is the case, then the only solution is to provide accurate and copious information to prospective immigrants around the globe so that they can make optimal locational choices rather than relying on herd instincts.
